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ABSTRACT
The essay analyses the role of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) in the
war waged against Croatia from 1990 to 1992. The author draws atten -
tion to the fact that from the end of the 1980s, the JNA was an active
party to the Serbian expansionist aspirations that gripped Yugoslavia after
Titos death. The Armys role is chronicled from the point of Croatias
democratisation in 1990 to its retreat in the spring of 1992, after having
only partially executed the tasks that Serbian expansionist policy had dele-
gated.
Following the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980, the Socialist
Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) entered the crisis-ridden
1980s. This decade was marked by incidents in Kosovo in 1981
and 1989, chronic economic crisis, and a rise in Serbian expan-
sionist nationalism directed towards the federal state, which  had
been defined and formally adopted with the enactment of the
1974 Constitution. The Yugoslav National Armys involvement
served to show that Serbian expansionist ideas had deeply affect-
ed even that institution, in which Serbs dominated1, and which had
*All afore-mentioned documents, unless otherwise specified, can be found in the pos-
session of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia.
1. Am omni-present characteristic of the Yugoslav National Army during the entire
course of its existence is the uneven structure of national representation in its com-
missioned officers corps, particularly among generals and higher ranking officer
personnel.  Prior to the war, Croatians in percentages comprised 12.6% of the Army
population, which when compared with their representation in SFRYs population
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for years represented itself as the prime defender of Titos legacy2.
The JNA, which was publicly touted as a microcosm of Yugoslavia,
evolved into a small-scale Serbia by the beginning of the 1990s.
The Army, which had been an imposing political factor and the
defender of the socialist state3, was unable to remain a peaceful
bystander during the political changes that occurred in SFRY. 4
The JNA, along with the Territorial Defence (here-after
referred to as the TD), constituted SFRYs integrated Armed
Forces5.  The JNA was the operationally ready, well-armed feder-
al component, while the TD was the inferiorly armed and relative-
represented a –53 deficit, Slovenes comprised 2.8% representing a –66 deficit,
Muslims 2.4% representing a –78 deficit, while Albanians comprised 0.6% repre-
senting a –66 deficit.  On the other hand, a 63.2% Serbian representation in the
officer population represented a +51surplus, Montenegrins comprised 6.2% rep-
resenting a +148 surplus, while Yugoslavs comprised 3.6% representing a +45
surplus. Davor DOMAZET, How Aggression Against Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina Was Prepared or the Transformation of the JNA into a Serbian Imperial
Force, Croatian International Relations Review, Vol. V, No. 14-1999, pages 2-3.;
Teodor GERŠEK, Who Controls the Yugoslav Army, Revija Obramba (Ljubljana), No
4-1991, 56 to 61.  
2. Veljko KADIJEVIC, My Perspective of the Break-up, Belgrade 1993, 5, claims that
SFRYs 1974 Constitution marked the beginning of the transformation of the JNA
into an army without a state.
3. The 944th Rear-echelon Base Command, Classified No 159-65, 7th of December,
1989, to the 2nd Technical Warehouse Command, Transcript of Titos Authentic
Views on the status and role of the JNA and the armed forces in our system.
4. The JA (Yugoslav Army). As of 1951 the JNA was afforded an exceptional status and
its origins can be drawn from World War II.  The Army commander, Josip Broz Tito,
was also the first politician and party leader.  Following the war, The JNAs exclu-
siveness, initially originating on account of special relations with the Leader, was
continuously supplemented with the appropriation of new exclusive privileges.  This
revolutionary pedigree was further afforded the role of a defender of socialist ideo-
logical purity and its resulting achievements.  In time, the monopoly of the countrys
defence capacities against outside aggression was broadened and redirected so as
to include the internal protection of party (ideological) values and objectives as they
relate to order in society .  Miroslav HADŽIC, The Armys Use of Trauma, The
Serbian Perspective of War, Trauma and Catharsis through Historical Recollection,
prepared by Nebojša Popov, Beograd 1996, 562.
Miroslav HADŽIC, The Armys Use of Trauma, The Serbian Side of the War, Trauma
and catharsis in historical memory, Nebojša Popov, Belgrade 1996, 562. 
5. The JNA was a united military power…of all peoples and nationalities and the
strength of the united military forces while the Territorial Defence (TD) was the most
general….form of organizing working class people and citizens for combat and
execution of specific tasks for public defence, and the most general form of organ-
ization for general armed resistance.  The Strategy of General Defence and Public
Self-Defence of the SFRY, The Federal Secretariat for the Peoples Defence (SSNO),
Belgrade, 1987., pp.54-56.   
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ly less mobile component at the republic level, and was envisaged
as an all-pervasive support mechanism for the JNA6.   In terms of
their interrelationship, the JNA and the TD were completely equal,
and in wartime, these two components were intended to comple-
ment one another through a nation-wide armed resistance con-
cept.  As with the JNA, where the competent authority for its
deployment was the SFRY Presidency, the same was the case with
the Territorial Defence, which in peace-time was under the juris-
diction of Republic level and regional authorities.  After Titos
death, these republic and provincial authorities reinforced their
political influence7.   Equality between the two components which
comprised the armed forces was legally affirmed in the provisions
of the 1974 Constitution.  This is one of the measures that pre-
vented the centralisation of Yugoslavia and thereby thwarted the
most populous nation from dominating the others through any of
the federal institutions.
During the mid-eighties, a reorganisation of the JNA was car-
ried out under the Unity Plan.  In terms of the military ground
forces, the former armies (six in total and one independent corps)
were abolished.  With the exception of Croatia and Serbia, the
army zones, which were roughly identical to the jurisdictional
areas of the republics, were abolished and replaced with corps
structured military districts8.  Prior to the transition to that plan, a
long period was required for the military elite to convince the var-
ious federal institutions that the formation of military corps district
commands would not deprive the republics and provinces of their
rights and obligations, but rather would enable the JNA to cen-
tralise its operations both in wartime and in peace.  The proposal
was adopted despite the fact that the question of republic and
provincial subordination was again raised.  At the beginning of
1998, the political leadership of Slovenia requested that this deci-
sion be revised, as they had realised just in time that the JNA,
despite statements to the contrary, was heading toward unitarian-
ism.  On the basis of a ruling by the SFRY Presidency, republic and
provincial TD commands were rendered subordinate to the mili-
tary corps district commands in wartime; likewise, TD units were
rendered subordinate to corps commands.  The position of the
JNA representative was that in this manner duplication of strate-
gic, operational and tactical commands was avoided.9
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6 The Strategy of Armed Combat, SSNO, Belgrade 1983., pp. 69, 109-110.
7 Branko MAMULA, The Yugoslavia Case, Podgorica 2000., pp.49, 55.
8 Along with three infantry commands of military districts, there was an Air Force, Anti-
aircraft and Naval Command at the same rank.
9 The Federal Secretariat for the peoples defence I, Development of the armed forces
of SFRY 1945-1985, book 7/I,Belgrade 1990, pp. 375-6; Branko MAMULA, The
Case of Yugoslavia, pp.59-68.
In Zagreb on the 25th of December, 1988, the command of
the 5th peacetime military district, also known as the Command
of the wartime Northwest military district, became operational.10
According to the new division, the Northwest military district came
about by merging the 5th and 9th armies and encompassed
Slovenia, northwest Croatia, parts of Istria with Gorski Kotar, Lika,
Kordun and Banovina.  In 1988 four corpuses were formed in that
region.  Two were in Slovenia, the 14th in Ljubljana, and the 31st
in Maribor.  The northern part of Istria and the Croatian coastal
region were assigned to the 13th corpus in Rijeka.  Northwest
Croatia was the region of the 32nd Corpus in Varaždin.11 The
larger part of Kordun was the region of the 6th proletarian infantry
division in Karlovac, while Zagreb and the surrounding area had
a separate Defence Command of the city of Zagreb.12 Air support
to the 5th military district was given by the 5th corpus of the air
force and anti-aircraft divisions located in Zagreb.13 The remain-
ing, larger part of Croatian territory was divided between the 1st
military district and the naval district.  The 1st military district was
located in Belgrade and encompassed Slavonia and 17 corpuses
in Tuzla.  The naval district was in Split and generally maintained
its existing organisation: a fleet and three naval sectors with a
newly formed 9th corpus.  The naval district was responsible for
the Adriatic coast and part of northern Dalmatia.  Northern
Dalmatia encompassed the zone of the 9th corpus in Knin, the 5th
naval sector in Pula was responsible for the northern part of the
Adriatic coast, the 8th sector in Šibenik for the middle, and the 9th
in Kuboru in Boka Kotorska for the southern part of the Adriatic
coast.14
The victory of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) at the
first free and democratic elections in April 1990 in Croatia was a
10. SSNO, Joint Chiefs JNA, 1st Directorate, DT. No. 374-184/87, 10.XI.1998.,
Command of the 5th army, Orders.; 
11. Command of the 5th army, DT No. 7-1, 23.I.1989. Report on combat readiness
for 1998.
12 Overview of the zones of responsibility, working map of the Command 5th Military
District.  The map was made according to the orders of the Command of the 5th
M.D., DT. No. 24-1 of the 13.XII.1988.
13. SSNO, Joint Chiefs of the JNA, I. Directorate, DT. No.68-I, 16.XII.1986.,
Command of the 5th army, Orders; SSNO, JCS AF SFRY, I Directorate, SP. No. 532-
I, 14.III.1989., Command of the 5th Military District,  Improvement and develop-
ment of administration and command of the armed forces.
14. The Navy, Development of the Armed Forces SFRY 1945-1985, Belgrade, 1988,
Gojko UZELAC The problems of armed combat on JPV and long-term equipping
of troops KoV JNA in M.D. with funds of the NVO. JNA, 1987., 263.; SSNO, JCS
AF SFRY, 1st Directorate, SP. No. 532-1, 14.III.1989., Command of the 5th M.D.,
Improvement and development of administration and command of the armed
forces.146
signal for the armed forces to interfere with Croatias road toward
sovereignty.  A few days prior to HDZs   assumption of power in
Croatia, the JNA (May 23rd, 1990) confiscated the weapons of
the territorial defence of the Socialist Republic of Croatia and put
them in storage in its warehouses.15  This was done on orders of
the Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - Armed Forces of the
SFRY on May 14th, 1990 due to the secure placement and pro-
tection of arms and ammunition of the territorial defence.16 The
confiscation of weapons violated the official concept of peoples
defence, in respect to the TD as an equal component of the
armed forces, and was carried out without the confirmation of the
Presidency of SFRY.17 Army General Kadijevic justified the actions
by arguing that the weapons were exclusively under the jurisdic-
tion of the army, and not the republics which had no right to them.
He consoled them by stating that the weapons could be returned
once the republics could guarantee good defence conditions.18
Confiscation of the TD weaponry resulted in organisational
and formational changes in the 1st and 5th military districts (m.d.)
as well as the naval districts.  The 1st m.d., 10th motorized
brigade in Mostar was reclassified from B to A, the crucial factor
being the incorporation of an armoured and mechanised battal-
ion into its system per A classification.19 In Banja Luka the 329th
armoured brigade was also transformed from B to A classification
and located in part in Derventa.  The Knin corpus, in which the
221st motorized brigade was partially transformed into A classifi-
cation, also incorporated an armoured and mechanised battal-
ion.  The armoured battalion was located in Benkovac, and the
mechanised battalion  in Knin.  As in the case of the 10th motor-
ized brigade, this was an unusual formational change for this type
of brigade.20
The most significant changes, however, took place in the 5th
military district.  The 6th proletarian infantry division, as well as the
defence command of the city of Zagreb, were eliminated.  The
15. Chronology of the War, The Aggression on Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina, The
Croatian Information Centre, Zagreb, 1998., p.23.
16. SSNO, JCS AF SFRY, p. No. 19-1, 14.V.1990., Command of the 5th M.D., Orders.
17. The President of the Presidency of the SFRY, Borisav Jovic, noted in his diaries We
quite practically disarmed them.  Formally the Commander of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff did this but in fact according to our orders.  The Slovenes and Croats reacted
harshly to no avail.  We shall not permit the misuse of the weaponry of the Territorial
Defence for eventual conflicts or forceful separation. Borisav JOVIC, The Last Days
of the SFRY, Belgrade 1996., p.146.
18. Borisav JOVIC, The Last Days of the SFRY, Belgrade 1996., pp. 146-7.
19. According to wartime formation, A formations had 60-100% troop capacity, B type
had 15-60% and R type had up to 15% troop capacity.
20. SSNO, JCS AF SFRY, 1st Directorate, No.1487-171/89,15.V.1990. Command of
the 5th M.D., Order.147
region surrounding Zagreb as well as Kordun and Banovina were
incorporated into the new formation of the 10th corpus.  The for-
mation of the 10th corpus, located in Zagreb, was placed outside
regular activity in the organisational and formational changes
according to the Unity 2 and 3 plan.  The newly formed corpus
was enhanced by the 32nd corpus, 140th motorized brigade B,
and the 31st mechanised brigade R; from this amalgamation the
140th mechanical brigade of A classification was formed.  The
4th armoured brigades located in Jastrebarsko and Karlovac were
reclassified from B to A and were placed under the command of
the 10th corpus.  The formation of the 10th corpus separated the
JNA from the territorial defence of the city of Zagreb.  The 32nd
corpus, 265th mechanised brigade from Bjelovar and Koprivnica,
was also transformed from B to A as well as the 13th corpus, 13th
proletarian motorized brigade located in Ilirska Bistrica and
Rijeka.  Changes also occurred in Slovenia where the 14th cor-
pus, 1st armoured brigade in Vrhniki was also reclassified from B
to A.  These formational changes directly resulted in strengthening
the formations offensive strength and firepower while increasing its
mobility outside of transport routes.  Formations directly under the
command of the 5th military district, the 580th mixed artillery
brigade in Karlovac, and the 288th combined anti-armour
artillery brigade in Virovitica and Križevci were also reclassified
from B to A.21 Further developments showed that most of these for-
mations, until the outbreak of the conflict in the summer of 1991,
were used to form what the JNA promoted as a buffer zone, while
they were in fact interfering in the work of the legal bodies of the
Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia.
In reclassifying formations of the 5th military district into A
class, the military command was attempting to avoid having to
rely on manpower in units where Croats were in the majority, and
instead brought in new recruits from other parts of Yugoslavia.
Insisting on armoured and mechanised formations was logical as
they were equipped with complex combat technology, which is
most effective.  Reliance on such formations was based on the
success they had displayed in Kosovo in the 1980s.22
The revolt of Croatian Serbs in the summer of 1990 marked
the beginning of the crisis in the Republic of Croatia.  The police
21. SSNO JCS AF SFRY, 1st Directorate, No. 1487-171/89,15.V.1990., Command of
the 5th M.D., Order; Command of the 5th M.D.,DT No. 2-14, 24.I.1991., Report
of the realisation of assignments from the plan Unity 2 and 3, in 1990.
22. The reason for the changes was mentioned in the memoirs of the President of the
Presidency of SFRY at the time Borisav Jovic when he noted that on the 8th of June,
1990 the Minister of Defence Veljko Kadijevic said we decided to form special
motorized corpuses in the regions of Zagreb, Knin, Banja Luka, and Herzegovina
which will be prepared, when necessary, to function as in Kosovo. B. JOVIC, The
Last Days of the SFRY, p.152.148
station in Knin rejected (July 3rd, 1990) the authority of the
Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia.23 In the Knin
region (August 17th) armed Serb civilians blocked transport
routes.  Attempts by Special Forces of the Croatian Interior
Ministry to quell the revolt at its inception were blocked by the
JNA, which openly supported the armed Serb civilians from the
moment they took to the streets.  The Federal Secretariat of the
Peoples Defence of SFRY justified air force intervention by citing
the unannounced flight of Croatian helicopters lacking airspace
confirmation.24 This violation of the sovereignty of the Republic of
Croatia had the popular support of Serbs in Bosnian Krajina and
Serbia proper at various rallies urging an armed uprising.25
Immediately thereafter, on August 18th, 1990, rebel Serbs
attacked police stations in Donji Lapac, Titova Korenica, Graèac,
Obrovac, and Benkovac.  Next an attempt was made to create
disturbances and destabilise the constitutionally defined order in
the region of Petrinja – a mixed ethnic region where Croats com-
prised the majority.  The disturbances, however, occurred in the
periphery where Serbs were in the majority.  During the attacks on
the police stations in Petrinja, Glina, Dvor na Uni, and Obrovac
in northern Dalmatia, local Serbs confiscated 200 rifles and com-
pact rifles, 150 handguns, 23 machine guns, and approximately
110,000 pieces of ammunition.26 The convenient repositioning of
the 9th corpus in the Knin region allowed the rebel Serbs to qui-
etly organise their armed forces and broaden the uprising to other
parts of the Republic of Croatia.  Due to the unequal distribution
of power, the Croatian leadership did not even consider a direct
confrontation with the JNA; the weapons at the Croat` s disposal
were useless against a well-armed federal army.  Achieving calm
and order in parts of the country had to be achieved indirectly. The
unarmed government of the Republic of Croatia had to take pos-
session of the weapons in order to quash the rebellion, which was
a danger politically and economically to the young Croatian state.
In addition to the formation of the generals` party, the
Communist Union-the Movement for Yugoslavia, two other events
are worth mentioning in regard to the federal armed forces
actions.  The first was the renowned statement by the federal
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23. Day of Security, Krajina Army (Knin), journal of the Serb Krajina Army, July 1995,
p.18.
24. The army has a mission to stop a fratricidal war Peoples Army
(Belgrade),23.VIII.1990,p.5; Two years later the government of the rebel Serbs
made a decision which Confirms…that the war on the territory of the Serb Republic
of Krajina began on the 17th of August, 1990. Serb Republic of Krajina,
Government, No.04-3-270/92, 28.VII.1992., Decision. 
25. B. JOVIC, The Last days of the SFRY, pp.178-9.
26. The army embraced the people, Stolen weapons, Peoples Army, 11.X.1990., pp.4-
5,15.
defence secretary Kadijevic in an interview for the Zagreb weekly
Danas:  The territorial defence, as formed at the end of the sixties
and the beginning of the seventies, is objectively…a deliberate act
of deceit which, after the collapse of the political concept on
which it was founded, proved to serve as the foundation for the
republic armies.27 Kadijevic`s interview was a clear message and
threat to Croatia and Slovenia, republics which offered a confed-
erative model for the peaceful redefinition and redesign of
Yugoslavia.  It was also a direct attack on Tito s legacy,  which the
JNA publicly pretended to uphold.  The second event was the for-
mation of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, a body
that is active only in time of war.28
Once the federal ministry of defence reported to the
Presidency of the SFRY on December 11th, 1990, that armed
paramilitary units were being unofficially formed,29 the Presidency
decided to disband armed paramilitary units (January 9th).30 This
decision illustrated the insurmountable differences that existed.
The Croatian government considered the paramilitary units to be
in Krajina, while the JNA considered the legally organised units of
the Croatian Interior Ministry to be the actual paramilitary units.
After an unsuccessful attempt to disarm the republic, the JNA
launched an intensive media campaign against Croatia at the end
of January 1991.  Several Croatian citizens were arrested, and the
military court in Zagreb attempted to court-marshal the Croatian
Minister of Defence, Martin Špegelj.  The military journal, The
Peoples Army, released two issues titled The truth about the arm-
ing of the HDZ s terrorist formations in Croatia, dedicated solely
to this issue, which they distorted.  Meanwhile they ignored com-
pletely the intensive arming of the rebel Serbs.31 And led by mem-
bers of the Serbian Democratic Party, they continued to form their
armed forces in which they engaged retired officers, including
security forces of the JNA.32
27. We must disarm all armed formations created outside of the united and constitu-
tionally (SFRY) defined armed forces, Peoples Army, 6.XII.1990., 5.-9, Interview
from Danas. 
28. Antun TUS, The war in Slovenia and Croatia until the Sarajevo armistice, The War
in Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina 1991-1995, Zagreb-Sarajevo, 1999.,p.68;
SSNO JCS AF SFRY, 1st Directorate, No. 532-1, 14.III.1989., Improvement and
Development of Administration and Command in the armed forces; The Strategy of
the peoples defence and public self-defence of SFRY, p.82.
29. V.KADIJEVIC, My view of the break-up, p.111.
30. Presidency of the SFRY, No. 3, 9.I.1991., Order.
31. The truth about the arming of the HDZ`s terrorist formations in Croatia, The
Peoples Army, special edition, 26.I.1991.; The truth about the arming of the HDZ`s
terrorist formations in Croatia (2), The Peoples Army, 28.II.1991.
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The situation in Croatia intensified on  March 1st, 1991,
when rebel Serbs attacked the police station in Pakrac and dis-
armed the policemen of Croatian nationality.  The next day, due
to the intervention of special units of the Interior Ministry of the
Republic of Croatia, the rebellion was quashed.  Without assem-
bling the Presidency of the SFRY, the president of the Presidency,
Borisav Jovic, ordered the JNA to intervene.  Units from Bjelovar,
Virovitica, and Zagreb were sent to Pakrac, while the command of
the 32nd Corpus relocated its HQ there.33 The military journal
The Peoples Army mentioned in a report done a few days later the
take-over of police stations and new police administration, which
clearly indicates their solidarity with these acts and legitimises the
rebellion of the Serb minority in Croatia.  Headquarters com-
mander of the 5th military district, General Dobrašin Prašèevic,
stated in Pakrac that they had come to prevent an ethnic conflict,
to show and convince the people that they will not be left at the
mercy of special units (of the Interior Ministry), and to allow them
(the special units) to witness our readiness to prevent savagery and
bloodshed.34
The events in Pakrac triggered a request by the Headquarters
of the Supreme Command for a declaration of martial law in the
country and a suspension of all normative acts in contradiction to
the constitution of SFRY and federal law  (Presidency meeting of
SFRY held on the 12th to the 15th of March 1991).  The
Presidency of SFRY rejected this request in a 4-4 vote.
Montenegro, Serbia and the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina
and Kosovo voted in favor of the proposal.35 The military elite,
acting as the extended arm of Serbia, believed that the source of
the problem was the multiparty system in which non-Communist
parties triumphed in Croatia and Slovenia, and that the only solu-
tion was a return to the old system.36 This was one more instance
in which the JNA distanced itself from its constitutional obliga-
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32. Command 5th Corpus RV and PVO, Security Dept., SP.No.40-541, 10.XII.1990,
Security Sector KRV and PVO, Notes on the situation in Zadar and Knin; Command
5th Corpus RV and PVO, Security Dept., SP.No. 20-376 of 27.III.1991., Security
Sector KRV and PVO, OA Defence, Notes on the activities of the SDS in Zemunik. 
33. The people protected from aggression, The Peoples Army, 7.III.1991., p.4; B.
JOVIC, The last days of the SFRY, pp.281-2.
34. The people defended from aggression, The Peoples Army, 7.III.1991.,p.4; The
manner in which the JNA acted in Pakrac was the formula used for their actions in
the next few months and became their standard procedure. In their media and pub-
lic appearances they tagged this procedure the creation of a tampon zone which
did not allow for the functioning of the Croatian Interior Ministry.  These zones were
nothing but an attempt to maintain the status quo.
35. V. KADIJEVIC, My view of the break-up, p.113; B. JOVIC, The Last days of SFRY,
pp.286-95.
tions, and one step closer to its transformation into the armed
forces of the Serbian nation, within and beyond Serbia proper.
This position led soon after to JNA engagement in the arming and
training of rebel Serbs in Croatia.37 The deputy security chief of
the commander of the 10th corpus organised between April-July,
1990, the withdrawal of large amounts of weaponry and ammu-
nition from the military warehouses in Lika for use by the Serbian
Democratic Party.38
The following major incident occurred at the end of March,
when Serb paramilitary units barricaded the area of Plitvice on the
road from Slunj to Titova Korenica.  Special units of the Croatian
police successfully intervened and prevented the arrival of
armoured units of the JNA from the 1st and 5th military districts,
which were intending to create a buffer zone between the oppos-
ing parties.39 The Radan plan for extraordinary circumstances
clearly indicates that the true purpose for creating a buffer zone
was to prevent the consolidation of an elected government and
constitutional order in the Republic of Croatia.  At the beginning
of April, the 9th corpus of the JNA received orders to act in coop-
eration with the 8th naval sector and the 5th military district for the
purpose of preventing the passing of units of the Interior Ministry
through routes in the greater area of Zadar, Biograd, Šibenik,
Split, and Sinj which lead to Knin, Benkovac, and Obrovac.  The
directions of the 5th military district were to defend controlled
areas and control routes which lead through the Lika hills to the
areas of Graèac, Obrovac, and Knin.40 Having in mind that the
units of the 5th district created a buffer zone in the Plitvice area,
the entire Knin and Lika regions having majority Serb populations
were given a guard, which prevented any actions by the Interior
Ministry of the Republic of Croatia, and allowed for the further
development and organisation of the illegal rebel Serb govern-
ment.
36. At that meeting (of the Presidency) where the Serbian expansionist option did not
legally secure control of the country, the JNA leaned toward the option that accord-
ing to General Kadijevic meant the protection and defence of the Serbian people
outside of Serbia proper and the assembling of the JNA within the borders of the
future Yugoslavia. V. KADIJEVIC, My view on the break-up, pp.113-14.
37. Command 18th Corpus, No. 7-397/8, 26.VIII.1994. JCS ASK, Request for
extraordinary promotion of Vujic Matije Marka.
38. The Serb Army of Krajina, Command, Security Sector, S.P. No. 321-99,
16.X.1994., Command of the Serbian Republic, Request.
39. The army reinstates peace, The Peoples Army, 4.IV.1991., pp.4-5; The road to war
paved with victory, Serbian Army, (Sarajevo), journal of the Army of the Serbian
Republic, 9.V.1994., p.14.
40. Command 9th Corpus, DT – 1-4, 05.IV.1991., Command  9th bVP, Defence
orders Op. No. 1.152
After this, the JNA became actively engaged.  At the begin-
ning of April 1991, during a meeting of the Secretariat for the
Peoples Defence, it was decided to move some units westward.
Part of the elite 63rd airborne brigade was sent from Niš to
Zagreb.  From the 51st mechanised brigade in Panèevo, the 1st
armoured battalion was transferred to Petrinja in Banovina and
incorporated into the 622nd motorized brigade.41 The second
mechanised battalion of the 36th mechanised brigade from
Subotica and the 1st mechanised battalion of the 453rd mecha-
nised brigade from Sremska Mitrovica were transferred to eastern
Slavonia and Vinkovci and placed under the command of the
17th corpus.42 The armoured and mechanised components of the
10th motorized brigade from Mostar were transferred to the
Kupres highlands in May.43 By acting in this timely manner, they
managed to withdraw from areas with Croat majorities towards
areas that were more ethnically accommodating; they moved to
northern Dalmatia in September and were incorporated into the
9th corpus.  The activities of the JNA in eastern Slavonia were
accelerated in June with the engagement of the Naval River
Surveillance flotilla, whose units were used to supervise bridges
and crossings on the Danube River from Bezdan to Ilok, and to
serve as artillery support to infantry in the region.44
In May 1991 activities dramatically increased.  In Borovo
Selo, twelve Croat policemen were slaughtered at the hands of the
paramilitary èetniks.  This incident proved to be the beginning of
the armed uprising in the Vukovar municipality.45 The rebellion
spread around Vinkovci and Osijek, and the villages of Mirkovci
and Tenja were incorporated into the JNA buffer zone and
became èetnik strongholds.  In reaction to the increased tension
in the country, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command
ordered on May 6th increased JNA combat readiness and mobil-
isation of relevant units so that the JNA, in the event that federal
and republic bodies could not secure peace, can do so effective-
ly and according to its constitutionally defined role and responsi-
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bility.46 This was the excuse used for the mobilisation of reserves,
which occurred until the end of the year. The manner in which it
was carried out within the units of the 1st military district illustrat-
ed the reasoning behind the command.  In the areas of the 17th
corpus and other units in Slavonia and Baranja, all military com-
plexes were tightly secured, and in the event of an attack, the
command of the corpus ordered actions aimed at institutions
which organise these attacks, i.e., municipalities, police stations,
political party headquarters, military headquarters, training loca-
tions for paramilitary units, and so on.  Engage for these activities
AMU (armoured-mechanised units), and artillery and AAU (anti
aircraft units), and as necessary request the use of the air force, in
which case you must give the relevant institution a time-limited
ultimatum after which you may begin intensive action.  The order
was issued only to specially selected senior officers.47 The same
measures were undertaken in the units of the 5th military district
and the 5th corpus of the air force and anti-aircraft defence.48
The short-lived war in Slovenia began on the morning June
27th, 1991, when the JNA was sent in to take control of the bor-
der with Slovenia and place federal police and customs officers on
the border.49 The conflict, which ended quickly and without
intense fighting, led to the withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia.
For Croatia, this meant that the technical capabilities of the JNA
were moving from Slovenia into the neighbouring area of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Serbia.50 During the conflict in Slovenia,
armoured and mechanised units of the 1st military district were
positioned along the so-called administrative borders of Croatia
and Serbia.  Their operations were clearly a demonstration of
strength meant to underline to the Croatian armed forces the
imbalance in amounts and types of weapons between the two
sides.  An additional threat was the securing of the bridges over
the Danube, which was the last of the natural links between
Croatia and Serbia.  The Commander of the 12th corpus, Major-
General Mladen Bratic, announced that at the beginning of July
they had received several threats from extremists that they will
destroy bridges in order to prevent our efforts to stop the ethnic
conflict.  That is why we are controlling both sides of all bridges
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located between Vojvodina and Croatia.51 The securing of these
bridges was a clear signal that Serb tanks were no longer sepa-
rated from Croatia by the Danube, which was a large natural bar-
rier.52 The Armys journal The Peoples Army explicitly stated that its
goal was to prevent the war which is destroying our brotherhood,
protect the borders of Yugoslavia, and participate in the battle
against paramilitary formations increasingly  present in the region.
Stationed on the border around Šid were the 1st proletarian
brigade from Belgrade and the 453rd mechanised brigade from
Sremska Mitrovica.53 The 36th mechanised brigade from
Subotica took control of Baranja and the bridge between Bezdana
and Batina, while the 51st mechanised brigade from Panèevo
controlled the bridge and region around Bogojevo.54 Units of the
12th corpus controlled the bridge on the Danube between Ilok
and Baèka Palanka.55 The 12th proletarian56 mechanised brigade
in Osijek had part of its troops holding the military garrison, while
the other part was securing incoming and outgoing city roads
since this is the reasoning behind the exercise.57
Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Adžic, heav-
ily favoured the use of armoured and mechanised units58 which he
demonstrated at the beginning of August 1991 in his visit to the
1st proletarian mechanised brigade near Sremska Mitrovica and
the 329 armoured brigade in Banja Luka; both visits were covered
widely by the military press.59 In favouring the use of armoured
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units for extraordinary situations.  Their duties according to the directive were the
and mechanised units it was clear that the JNA had distanced
itself from the officially proclaimed strategy of armed combat.60
Though initially playing a tactical role, the armoured and mecha-
nised units now assumed an operative and strategic role, which
meant that the JNA was adopting a manner of organised combat
identical to that of a potential aggressor from the east or west; this
scenario had been developed for years during command and mil-
itary exercises.61 The reasoning behind such action is quite sim-
ple:  the military elite completely ignored the human factor and
approached the problem exclusively from a technical standpoint.
The armoured combat vehicles displayed the great technical
superiority of the JNA over the Croatian armed forces.
Preparations for war were also felt with changes in the chain
of command.  During the conflict in Slovenia significant person-
nel changes were made in the 5th military district.  Slovene
Lieutenant General Konrad Kolšek was replaced by Lieutenant
General Života Avramovic, who had been commander of the 3rd
military district.  Base commander Colonel Ljubomir Bajic took
following: securing the border; intensified guarding of military buildings; participa-
tion in guarding firms, public and other objects of particular importance; blocking
off certain areas; placing barricades and barriers on roads; patrolling certain areas;
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command of the 5th corpus of the air force and anti-aircraft
defence.62 This was a clear signal to and expression of distrust for
non-Serb personnel.  Thus personnel transferred to the northwest
front had ethnic links to the group that dominated the officer
corps.  The ethnic structure of the JNA officer corps in Slovenia
and Croatia at that time, according to the Command of the 5th
military district, favored the Serbs, who comprised 57%; 12% were
Croats, 6% Slovenes, 5% Montenegrins, 4% Yugoslavs, and 16%
other nationalities.63
The war in Slovenia provided an excuse to mobilise part of the
units of the 5th Banja Luka corpus, the 12th Novi Sad corpus, and
the 2nd corpus in Montenegro. In the 52nd corpus in Kosovo,
combat units were strengthened to 100% capacity.64 On the 3rd
of August, the ministry of the peoples defence of the Socialist
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina announced that since the
beginning of August some commanders of the JNA combat units
were mobilising soldiers, thereby ignoring procedure and the
commands of bodies of higher authority, particularly in Han
Pijesak.65 Since the mobilisation was not going according to the
JNAs plan, it was decided that the September class of recruits
would have their stay extended by twenty days.66 The delay in the
confrontation with Croatia had a negative effect on the combat
readiness of the JNA, since they were unable to arm their reserves
forever.
The war had began without any official declaration.67 Villages
inhabited by Serbs, such as Tenja near Osijek, Mirkovci near
Vinkovci, and Borovo Selo near Vukovar became support posi-
tions for the rebel Serbs, èetniks, and the JNA in the war.  In July,
èetnik groups and rebel Serb units with heavy weaponry began
moving into Croatian territory and ethnically cleansing all non-
Serbs. Despite the power imbalance, every attempt of Croat forces
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to overpower the rebels and their confederates brought in from
Serbia, as was the case in Mirkovci and Tenja on the 5-7th of July
1991, was prevented by the armoured and mechanised units of
the federal army.  The JNA openly took the side of the èetniks,
defined in certain places the zones it would place under its pro-
tection, as in Mirkovci, and consequently attempted to expand
into key objects under Croatian control.68
On July 11th , the rebel Serbs mobilised their headquarters
and units,69 and then under the protection of armoured and
mechanised units of the federal army assembled their paramilitary
structure.  Its organisation began immediately after the Knin inci-
dents in August 1990.  The process was slow and relatively inef-
fective due to conflicts among the rebel leaders.  The climax
occurred in mid-1991 in Knin, when several paramilitary armies
were formed.  Along with police and the Territorial Defence inher-
ited from before, or, more accurately, appropriated from the  legal
components of the Republic of Croatia, other small units were
formed, ranging from the special units of Captain Dragan to var-
ious partisan armed units whose manpower came mainly from
Serbia.70 The police was under the command of interior minister
Mile Martic, and the territorial defence of Serb Krajina (SAO
Krajina) Premier Mile Babic, who was also minister of defence.
The combat readiness of these units was limited, though with their
heavy weaponry they were superior to the Croatian army and
police until the end of September 1991.  These groups were not
capable of executing complicated tasks, and their total collapse
and military defeat by Croatian units was prevented due to assis-
tance from the federal army and its buffer zones.  In late July,
regional headquarters were organised in Kordun and Banovina.71
At a government meeting of the SAO Krajina on August 1st,
1991, it was decided that the armed forces be composed of the
territorial defence under the command of the premier of SAO
Krajina.  In August, the Ministry of Defence issued a decision
regarding the organisation of the defence system, in which the
headquarters of the territorial defence of Krajina would oversee
the municipal headquarters of TD Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac,
Graèac, Donji Lapac, Titova Korenica, and the zone headquarters
of the TD of Kordun and Banija.  The interior minister Mile Martic
was named deputy commander of the TD and member of the
headquarters of the TD for police units.72 The organisation of
operative zones of the TD SAO Krajina was conducted on August
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20th, 1991.  The 1st operative zone was located in northern
Dalmatia, the 2nd in Kordun and the 3rd in Banovina.73
The organisation of the Serb rebel armed forces was imple-
mented parallel to attacks aimed at cleansing the terrain of
Croatians. After eastern Slavonia, the second critical zone opened
up at the end of July in Banovina, when the TD of the rebel Serbs
from Dvor na Uni, organised as the 1st Dvor order, participated
in a battle to completely emancipate the municipality.74 The
Croatian villages of Zamlaèa and Struga were seized, while the
mechanised unit of the 329th armoured brigade stood nearby
awaiting completion of the offensive.75 Farther north, the
armoured battalion of the 51st mechanised brigade attacked the
police station in Glina, doing its part in the ethnic cleansing of
Croats in Banovina.76 The larger part of the 51st mechanised
brigade in eastern Slavonia activated itself as well. After the attack
of Serb paramilitary units on the police station in Dalj on August
1st, the brigade sided openly with additional air support with the
èetniks in battle, which resulted was the deaths of several dozen,
and the expulsion of hundreds Croats from Dalj, Aljmaš, and
Erdut.  The majority of the brigade then continued westward
towards the village of Serb-inhabited Bijelo Brdo where they hun-
kered down.77 After cleansing Erdut, Dalj, and Aljmaš they pro-
ceed to consolidate the communications sectors of the 12th and
17th corpuses in order to survey paramilitary formations – as they
referred to Croatian units, as well as to wage similar joint endeav-
ours.78 By the end of August the 36th mechanised brigade had
occupied Baranja, reinforced by èetniks and the remaining Serb
paramilitary groups79, while the armoured and mechanised units
of the 17th corpus were preparing for an offensive targeting
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bridges on the Drava and Sava rivers to prevent a Croatian count-
er-attack.80
On August 13th  in western Slavonia, the local Serbs pro-
claimed the Autonomous Serb District (SAO) of western Slavonia
and annexed it to the SAO Krajina.  On August 16th, their para-
military units in Okuèani attacked units of the Croatian police and
the National Guard Corps.  In light of this attack, the government
of the Republic of Croatia urgently requested a meeting of the
Yugoslav Presidency.81 On August 16th, combat units of the
265th mechanised brigade were sent to the crisis areas.82
Croatian policemen in Okuèani were also attacked by part of the
329th armoured brigade, which had been brought in from Bosnia
and Herzegovina.83 The leadership of the Republic of Croatia
accused the army of open aggression but the military court reject-
ed the charge as  unfounded, stating that it is absolutely logical
that the forces of the 1st military district and units of the Banja
Luka corpus were summoned to prevent an inter-ethnic con-
frontation in its zone of responsibility.84 The situation in Croatia
and the significance of the sites of confrontation were so obvious
that a journalist from the Sarajevo daily Osloboðenje asked the
Command of the Joint Chiefs if the confrontation line in Virovitica-
Karlovac-Karlobag in Croatia, which is already in some places
being described as the boundary of a rump Yugoslavia,
Serboslavia, or greater Serbia, represents what will ultimately
become part of a new country.85
The units of the JNA in Croatia and Slovenia were placed in
a difficult situation when Croatian and Slovene recruits for oblig-
atory military service stopped reporting. Macedonia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina were also reluctant to send recruits after the release
of the June 1990 generation of recruits.  The obligatory military
service system in western Yugoslavia completely disintegrated and
the JNA was left without soldiers after having been forced to
release them after one year of obligatory service.  The released
soldiers in some areas could not be replaced, and consequently
the JNA lacked sufficient forces to maintain the buffer zones  and
support staff in their bases.  The JNAs role in northwest Dalmatia
in the operative zone of the 9th Knin corpus and eastern Slavonia
and Baranja became obvious.  After a three day session of the
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Croatian parliament, a decision was brought on August 3rd,
requesting the JNA to withdraw to its garrisons without delay and
within an certain proscribed period to totally withdraw from the
territory of the Republic of Croatia.86 Since the JNA completely
ignored the parliamentary decision and continued its aggression,
Croatian forces began applying pressure on the garrisons at the
beginning of September.  The order of the president of the
Presidency of SFRY, Stipe Mesic, (September 11th) for the units of
the JNA to withdraw to its garrisons within 48 hours was dismissed
as illegal by the military leadership.  The military brass also dis-
missed notions that rebel Serb units designated territorial defence
were acting under the command and in concert with the JNA.87 A
few days later the Commander of JNA Military Headquarters
General Adžic repeated the same fabrications in an interview to
BBC. 88
The blockade of the garrisons forced the JNA to expedite its
plans due to the potential threat that the Croatians could obtain
heavy weaponry and modern equipment.  This was illustrated in
the threat made by the Command Headquarters to the Croatian
political and military leadership that every attack and captured
complex of the JNA will result in the destruction of one complex
of vital interest to the Republic of Croatia and that for every
attacked and seized garrison one vital complex in the city where
the garrison is located will be destroyed.  This was also a warning
to civilians to withdraw from those locations89 before the federal
army initiates its next phase of attacks in Croatia: a strategic offen-
sive operation.  The operation was followed by a decision of the
incomplete Presidency of the SFRY which introduced work condi-
tions during  threat of war and assumed certain rights of the par-
liament of the SFRY, which could not be convened.  According to
this decision the Presidency of the SFRY makes decisions based on
a majority vote of the members of the Presidency of SFRY present.
Dr. Branko Kostic, vice president of the Presidency, practically
usurped the position of president after this decision and
announced: the Presidency of the SFRY will not use military force
to impose its will upon any of the peoples in Yugoslavia.90
Precisely at this moment, the majority of JNA resources was
imposing the will of the political and military elite of the largest
ethnic group in SFRY (the Serbs), onto the second largest (the
Croats).  
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The operation began at the end of September, and its goal
was to defeat the Croatian army if circumstances permit, achieve
full co-operation with Serb units in Serb Krajina, and allow for the
complete withdrawal of remaining JNA units in Slovenia.91 The
operational plan foresaw fifteen to eighteen armoured, mecha-
nised and infantry brigades, in addition to the previously engaged
units of the JNA.  According to General Veljko Kadijevic the basic
reasoning behind the offensives is – a complete blockade of
Croatia from air and sea; and organising attack routes of the
main forces of the JNA to link liberated Serb regions in Croatia
with JNA garrisons deep inside Croatian territory.  With this in
mind, Croatia was to be divided along the routes Gradiška-
Virovitica; Bihac-Karlovac-Zagreb; Knin-Zadar; Mostar-Split.  The
strongest armoured and mechanised divisions were to liberate
eastern Slavonia, quickly continue westward, merge with units in
western Slavonia, and go on to Zagreb and Varaždin; that is,
toward the Slovene border.  At the same time, they were to land-
lock Dubrovnik with strong units from the direction of Herceg
Novi-Trebinje, and then continue into the Neretva valley and com-
bine forces with the units on the Mostar-Split route. When they
reached the relevant objects, they would then secure and main-
tain the borders of Serb Krajina in Croatia, withdraw the remain-
ing JNA troops from Slovenia, and subsequently withdraw the JNA
from Croatia; 10-15 days would be necessary for the mobilisa-
tion, preparation for mobilisation, or remobilisation of units, and
for their arrival at the operational routes, depending on the com-
bat readiness of the units and their distance from these routes.92
In the first days of the operation, the Federal Secretary of Defence
General Kadijevic announced that at this moment the Army
desires only to maintain control in the crisis areas, protect the Serb
civilians from harassment and destruction, and free members of
the JNA and their families, the prerequisite being the defeat of the
Ustaša forces.93
Croatia was to be divided up, and forced to acquiesce and
accept all Serb demands.  However, a poor showing of reserves
in the 1st and 3rd military districts placed a strain on these exalt-
ed plans.94 The federal army tried to alleviate the problem by
accepting volunteers, for which a special directive was drafted.
According to it, the volunteers were given the same status and
rights as military personnel and soldiers carrying out their obliga-
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tory military service.  Each volunteer was required to sign a state-
ment in which he/she pledged to uphold existing federal laws and
other acts and orders which regulate affairs, life, and work in the
Yugoslav Peoples army.95 By this, the JNA had tacitly accepted
waging war alongside various partisan Serb paramilitary units.
Their shared aspiration, a Great Serbia, eliminated ideological or
political differences that might previously have existed.
During the aggression against Croatia, the rebel Croatian
Serbs increased their personnel significantly  On the 20th of
September, a large number of commissioned and non-commis-
sioned officers was sent to the headquarters of the TD SAO
Krajina and the operative zones Banija-Kordun and Lika to com-
mand the Serb paramilitary forces.96 This confirmed the JNAs offi-
cial legalisation of the so-called territorial defence of SAO
Krajina, which became its partner in combat.  At the end of
September, the paramilitary forces finally organised themselves.
The region of northern Dalmatia and Lika was divided into two
zones, zone 1 for Dalmatia, under the command of headquarters
of the TD SAO Krajina, and Lika for the 2nd zone.  The regions
of Kordun and Banovina were merged into the 3rd operative
zone.97 The other armed component used for combat offensives,
the police, was placed under the command of the territorial
defence on the 9th of October.98
The JNA units concentrated their offensive operations on east-
ern Slavonia.  Armoured and mechanised brigade groups in east-
ern Slavonia and Srijem, composed of the 12th corpus and 1st
proletarian mechanised brigade corps and backed by the 24th
and 37th corpus, had been operatively developed and engaged
for weeks already in combat offensives prior to the commence-
ment of the operation.  The 12th corpus had participated in com-
bat offensives around Vukovar from the 25th of August.  After tak-
ing control of Baranja, the corpus directed the majority of its units
towards Vukovar while the support units were attacking Osijek.  At
the beginning of September, the military media openly reported
that the JNA air force is contributing greatly to the liberation of
Vukovar where a critical battle is being fought in order to assist the
Serb rebels.99 The battle for Vukovar, which lasted much longer
than expected, proved for the units of the 1st military district to be
their most difficult assignment. Vukovar was becoming less a mil-
itary problem than a blatant example of JNA aggression in sup-
163
95. SSNO, JCS AF SFRY, III Directorate, Pov. Br.2391-1, 13.IX.1991., Directions for the
recruiting of volunteers in the JNA.
96. SAO Krajina, HQ TD, No. 76/91. 25.11.91, Order No.24-175, Instructions upon
receiving of volunteers in the JNA.
97. SAO Krajina, Government, Premier, Pov. 1/1-91, 5.X.1991., Announcement.
98. SAO Krajina, Government, Permier, No. 2/1-91, 9.X.1991., Order.
99. Still under a shower of shelling, The Peoples Army, 18.IX.1991., p.11.
port of the Serb cause.  Logically, the city should simply have been
blockaded by smaller units and bypassed; this, however, was obvi-
ously not the plan.  In its westward advance towards central
Croatia, the federal army wanted to leave behind it a clean slate.
On the 31st of October and the 1st of November, General Adžic,
the commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the SFRY armed
forces, visited the units of the 1st military district to lift their wan-
ing morale.100 Vukovar was finally captured on the 18th of
November, 1991, by the forces of Operative group North, under
the command of Major General Andrija Biorèevic, Operative
group South under the command of Colonel Mile Mrkšic, and air
support from the 1st airborne corpus, commanded by Colonel
Branislav Petrovic.  The operation itself was executed under
General Života Panic, commander of the 1st military district.101
The capture of the city was described by journalists in the follow-
ing manner: The liberators, units of the JNA, TD, and volunteers,
went house by house, whereby they were considerate of the lives
of the citizens, displayed their combat skills in inhabited areas,
and affirmed their humanity and bravery102; also, Vukovar is not a
captured city.  It is a city which has been liberated from the dark-
est neo-fascist and Ustaša ideology.  Thus there is no place for
doubt as to whether the destruction could have been avoided.
The neo-fascism was so aggressive and deep-rooted that all avail-
able force and methods were required to  destroy it.  There was
no other option.103
Participating in the battle for Vukovar were the 1st proletarian
mechanised division corps, the 12th, 36th, 51st, and 453 mech-
anised brigades, motorized brigade corps, the 80th motorized
brigade, the 211th and 252nd armoured brigade, the 20th par-
tisan brigade, the 16th mixed artillery brigade, the 63rd airborne
brigade, units of the TD from Sremska Mitrovica, Kragujevac, and
volunteers from Belgrade, Novi Sad, Ruma, Inðija, Sombor,
Smederevo, and Smederevska Palanka.  Local Serb rebel groups
from Negoslavac and Vukovar also participated.104
The elite unit of the federal army, the 1st proletarian mecha-
nised division corps backed by the 252nd armoured brigade from
Kraljevo, attacked positions south and southeast of the units of the
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12th corpus.  The aggression on Slavonia began when its 3rd pro-
letarian mechanised brigade corps attacked Vinkovci from the
direction of Ilaèa-Orolik-Èakovci at the end of September.  Its
commander subsequently boasted that in only three days we lib-
erated all the villages between Šid and Mirkovci.105 The division
corps arrived in the greater area of Vinkovci by the beginning of
October.  In October, along with the 252nd armoured brigade
and volunteer units Šumadija and Lepenica, they captured the vil-
lages of Dželetovac, Bapska, and Šarengrad.106 In an interview
for the military journal, The Peoples Army, division commander
General Dragoljub Aranðelovic bragged that his unit has
cleansed and is holding firmly the area between the Danube and
Bosut, and local government is being organised in the area.107
This display of honesty clearly illustrated the core and substance
of the JNAs assignment – the ethnic cleansing of Croatian territo-
ry of Croats and other non-Serbian ethnic groups and the instal-
lation of Serbian rule.  The prime example of the workings of the
1st proletarian mechanised division corps is Ilok, which they eth-
nically cleansed; this was confirmed in the agreement made on
October 14th, 1991, in Šid.108
In addition to attacking Vukovar and Vinkovci, Serb forces
also attacked Osijek after having seized Baranja at the beginning
of September.  The 12th proletarian mechanised brigade from the
villages of Stara Tenja, Silaš, and Trpinja, carried out combat
offensives and shelling of Croatian villages and Klisa, reinforced
by parts of the 51st mechanised and 544th motorized brigades.109
The 5th corpus launched combat offensives in western
Slavonia throughout September.  Contrary to how the large scale
operation had been envisioned, the JNA was only temporarily
engaged, which was a result of the rebellion of the Serb popula-
tion, which had assumed massive proportions.110 At the beginning
of September, the JNA seized Okuèani and directed its offensives
towards Novska and Pakrac.  Leading the offensive was the 329th
armoured brigade, reinforced periodically from the beginning of
September by units of the 5th corpus, and at mid-month by parts
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of the 16th proletarian motorized brigade, the 5th partisan, the
2nd partisan and the 343rd motorized brigade, subsequent to
being reinforced by reserves from Bosanska Krajina.111 Since the
mobilised forces of the 5th corpus were insufficient, they were
periodically reinforced by units brought in from Serbia – the 46th
partisan brigade from Èaèak, a battalion of the 84th motorized
brigade from Bitolja, and a division of multiple rocket launchers
of the 150th mixed artillery brigade from Vranj.112 Though the
local Serb turnout was massive, these forces failed to break
through to Bjelovar and Varaždin to join forces with the 32nd cor-
pus in Varaždin, Bjelovar, and Virovitica, which would have con-
solidated a Serb victory in Slavonia.  After the surrender of the
32nd corpus, the forces of the 5th corpus concentrated their activ-
ities in the direction of Novska-Kutina-Zagreb, intending to rein-
force its areas around Jasenovac and Hrvatska Kostajnica.  Along
the secondary direction of Lipik-Pakrac-Daruvar, the local forces
of the HQ TD SAO Western Slavonia executed combat offensives
backed by the 5th corpus.  Their instructions were to control the
area until the arrival of the 12th corpus and 1st proletarian mech-
anised division corps from the east.  Towards the end of October,
both groups were stopped, and at the beginning of November
they were forced to retreat towards Okuèani and the Sava River,
which botched the signing of a cease-fire.113
In central Croatia the command of the 5th military district
planned to carry out its offensive by concentrating several opera-
tive groups in numerous directions: the 1st operative group, com-
posed of parts of the 10th corpus, the territorial defence of the
rebel Serbs,114 and reinforcements from Serbia, had been
assigned to reach the Kupa river along the Petrinja-Karlovac line
and allow for the withdrawal of the surrounded forces in the
Karlovac and Zagreb garrisons; the supplementary tactical group
from the 5th Banja Luka corpus was assigned to cleanse the areas
from Plitvice through Slunj to Karlovac; the majority of the 10th
corpus with part of the units from the 5th military district -exclud-
ing for the forces of the 1st operative group - were to withdraw
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through Velika Gorica towards Petrinja, and then towards Dvor na
Uni and Bosanski Novi;  the 13th corps in Rijeka and Delnice
were to organise an offensive in the general direction of Rijeka-
Delnice-Vrbovsko-Slunj-Plitvice, along with defending the gar-
risons; parts of the 32nd corpus in Bjelovar and Koprivnica were
to break through towards Bjelovar-Grubišino Polje-Daruvar and
join the forces of the 5th corpus, which were operating from deep
inside the territory; the offensives of the 1st operative group and
the withdrawal of forces from the 10th, 13th, and 32nd corps and
the individual units of the 5th military district were supported by
heavy artillery and the air force, which were assigned to attack
vital complexes in Zagreb.115 The orders of the 5th military district
made clear the intent to withdraw forces from areas ethnically
unfavourable towards areas with Serb majorities, and to cut into
the border zone through offensives of areas where Serbs com-
prised the majority. This was apparent in the case of Kordun,
whose ethnic borders the JNA intended to seize while purging the
Croat inhabitants behind the scenes.  
The intricate plans of the 5th military district failed due to the
surrender of the 32nd corpus and the blockade of most of the
10th and 13th corps, and the poor showing of reserves from
Serbia and Bosanska Krajina.  An attempt by the 1st operative
group to break through to Zagreb via Turopolje and extract the
surrounded forces of the 10th corpus was botched.  The group
managed to reach the Krupa River and the outskirts of Karlovac,
which was no great feat considering the favourable ethnic com-
position of that area.  Attempts to break through to Sisak,
Mošcenica, Komarevo, and Slunj proved unsuccessful, leaving the
demarcation line inactive in December.116 In the central and
southeast zone of the 5th military district, altercations continued to
the end of the year.  In light of the fact that the 13th corpus from
Rijeka and the majority of units in Istria and Gorski Kotar were sur-
rounded and isolated from the remainder of the corpus, combat
offensives were undertaken in southern Lika by the 9th corpus,
while the rest of Lika and Kordun were handed over to the 3rd
operative group under the direct command of the 5th military dis-
trict.  By mid-November in this area, the JNA seized Slunj with the
assistance of local Serb units and drove out Croat inhabitants,
thus creating a compact ethnic zone with a Serb majority.117
The 9th corpus, reinforced by local Serb forces, led combat
offensives in northern Dalmatia.  The corpus completed its oper-
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ations quickly, due to the superior positioning of most of its forces.
It was one of the few operative groups that did not have major
problems with troop reinforcements, some coming from its own
area, and others from Montenegro, while the majority, several
thousand reserves, came from Serbia, mainly Šumadija.118 They
were also reinforced with armoured and motorized units from the
1st and 3rd military districts.  The cleansing of Kijevo and Kruševo
at the beginning of September allowed for an advance on the
Adriatic cities. Beginning in October, the 9th corpus, along with
the 8th naval sector, the 1st corpus of the air force, and paramil-
itary and volunteer units, cleansed the hinterlands of Šibenik and
Zadar in aggressive offensives.119
The navy of the armed forces of SFRY also assisted
(September 17th, 1991) by barricading Adriatic ports and supply-
ing artillery support to units of the naval sector and infantry troops
in their attacks on Dubrovnik, Split, Zadar, Šibenik, and Ploèe.120
In southern Croatia, two operative groups of the federal army col-
laborated with the navy.  Activities in the direction Mostar-Split
were assigned to the 37th Užice corpus from Serbia.  On
September 20th, parts of the corpus began seizing the area of
eastern and central Herzegovina.121 However, due to a poor
turnout of reserves the assignment ended up being the securing of
the airport in Mostar and terrifying the non-Serb inhabitants of the
area.  Forces of the 2nd Podgorica corpus and 9th naval sector
Boka were active east of the 37th corpus.  Their activities in the
direction of Dubrovnik were co-ordinated by two operative groups
for southern Herzegovina and Dalmatia.122 The offensive on
Dubrovnik began on the 1st of October.  The village of Ravno in
eastern Herzegovina suffered relentless Serb aggression; it was
burned to the ground and its inhabitants driven out.123 By the 5th
of October Prevlaka was cleansed; pressure on Dubrovnik fol-
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lowed and it was surrounded and cut off from the rest of Croatia.
According to the commander of the 2nd operative group,
General Èokic, the republic of Montenegro provided him with
police forces in order to secure liberated territory, which along
with federal army reserves provided assistance.124 His successor,
Lieutenant General Pavle Strugar, made a public offer to move the
inhabitants of Dubrovnik out of the city at the end of October. 125
When the offer was rejected, the surrounded city was attacked
with mortar fire, most intensively at the beginning of December,
1991.126
The magnificent operation planned by the command of the
JNA was less successful than expected.  Infantry units of the JNA
were stopped in December, while the aerial assassination attempt
on the President of the Republic of Croatia on the 7th of October
1991 was also unsuccessful.127 After part of the JNAs assignments
were completed, a stalemate evolved which in the long run
worked against Serb interests.  Their combat forces were
approaching their goals but did not have the strength to continue
and finish the job.  Another, smaller component of the force that
was to participate in the first group was undersized and surround-
ed by Croatian cities.  Once the 32nd corpus had surrendered,
the possibility existed that the Croatian army would seize their
weaponry and commence a strategic counter-offensive.  The
Croatian problem was that some of their necessary forces were
engaged in the garrison blockade.  Successful offensives by
Croatian forces in November and December 1991 illustrated that
a continuation of the battle would be detrimental to the Serbs.
Subsequently, the JNA had to be satisfied with limited success,
hoping that the peacekeeping forces of the United Nations arriv-
ing in the war zone would safeguard their territorial acquisitions.
Under pressure from the international community, a compromise
was reached with the signing of an agreement on the 22nd of
October 1991, under which the remaining forces of the 5th mili-
tary district of the JNA were to evacuate Croatia and leave the
confiscated weapons of the territorial defence to the Croats.128
The evacuation was completed on the 30th of December 1991.129
After the signing of an unconditional cease-fire agreement in
Sarajevo (2nd of January 1992) by representatives of the Republic
of Croatia and the Yugoslav Peoples Army, the hostility was notice-
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ably reduced.  United Nations peacekeeping forces began arriv-
ing and positioning themselves at the demarcation lines.130  At the
end of 1991, on the 30th of December, the JNA was reorganised
and the 5th military district eliminated.  The 2nd military district
was established and located in Sarajevo.  Incorporated into its
structure were the 10th corpus from the former 5th military district,
the 4th, 5th and 17th corps from the 1st military district, and the
9th corpus from the former naval district.  Incorporated into the
structure of the 10th corpus were three operative groups – the 6th
in Lika, the 7th in Banovina, and the 8th in Kordun, which came
about with the reorganisation of the 1st and 3rd operative groups.
Armed forces of the JNA from eastern Herzegovina and
Montenegro oriented towards southern Croatia became part of
the 4th military district.131
The first few months of 1992 marked the beginning of a brief
period during which the JNA had two main tasks.  It had to with-
draw from the territory of the Republic of Croatia and it had to
expend gret efforts to preserve its territorial acquisitions from the
war with Croatian armed forces.  This entailed reorganisation of
the rebel Serb armed forces from a Territorial Defence structure
into an army, and forming border units and a police brigade.132
At the end of February 1992, based on orders of the Commander
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff AF SFRY dated February 27th, military
reorganisation began in the areas the JNA had temporarily seized
from the Republic of Croatia.  Headquarters of the territorial
defence of the Serb Republic of Krajina and six zone stations of
the TD with accompanying brigades were formed.133 In mid-
March the Joint Chiefs of Staff AF SFRY dispatched to the Republic
HQ of the Territorial Defence of Krajina Instructions for the oper-
ation of HQ and units of territorial defence in preparing for
demobilisation and remobilisation, in which basic information for
demobilisation and mobilisation activities were given for the peri-
od upon withdrawal of JNA forces from Krajina.134 In accordance
with the orders of the Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of
the Armed Forces SFRY (March 24th, 1992) several organisation-
al changes were made in the territorial defence of the Serb repub-
lic of Krajina.  At the main headquarters level, a background base
was formed in Knin, and in the zone headquarters heavy artillery
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divisions, mixed anti-armour divisions, light artillery units of the
anti-aircraft defence, and background bases were formed.135
Along with the organisation of local Serb paramilitary units, a
directorate for special police forces under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Defence was also organised.  The directorate had juris-
diction over police brigades formed according to the same orders
in Knin, Korenica, Vojnic, Petrinja, Okuèani, Vukovar, Beli
Manastir, and Benkovac.136 Commissioned officers ranking from
captain to colonel were sent on April 22nd to the territorial
defence of the Serb republic of Krajina (SRK).  Headquarters com-
mander of the territorial defence SRK issued them assignments
and placement orders. This experienced command structure com-
posed of active officers was to create the conditions for a effective
engagement by the forces of the rebel Serbs.137 By the end of April
the JNA managed to do what the Serb rebel leaders had not suc-
ceeding in doing since August 1990.  Three separated areas or
autonomous Serbian districts, as they were dubbed by their cre-
ators, were combined into a united Serb republic of Krajina, the
first of the two Serb republics outside Serbia proper.
Handing the zones of responsibility over to UNPROFOR
began in mid-May 1992, after which only armed police units
remained in the region of so-called Krajina.  The armed forces
were demobilised and transformed into local headquarters.138
This marked the end of official JNA engagement in Croatia and
the withdrawal of its units and citizens of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia from the occupied regions of the Republic of Croatia.
The JNA ordered the army to withdraw all material and technical
resources and personnel from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina
by May 19th, 1992; this order was also binding for Croatia.  The
592nd motorized brigade was to withdraw from Glina to Vranje,
the 46th partisan brigade from Okuèani to Èaèak, the 51st mech-
anised brigade from Topusko to Novi Sad, a battalion of the 84th
motorized brigade from Okuèani to Zajeèar, the 1st battalion
592nd motorized brigade from Knin to Vranje, the artillery divi-
sion of the 102nd mixed anti-armour artillery brigade from Plitvice
to Negotin, and a multi-missile rocket launcher division of the
150th mixed artillery brigade from Okuèani to Vranje.  Units that
were unable to transfer their equipment surrendered it to a unit
assigned by the 2nd military district command.139
In accordance with the Serb position that it had a right to
neighbouring land going back several decades, the war waged
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against Croatia was first and foremost a territorial war directed
entirely against the Croat nation.  The destruction of the Croat vil-
lage of Ravno in eastern Herzegovina confirmed that the war was
aimed at Croats, regardless of their citizenship.  The ultimate goal
of the war can be summed up in three words:  ethnically cleansed
territory. The use of all available means was permitted to achieve
this goal. 
The first phase of the direct conflict lasted from the middle of
August, 1990 until the beginning of March, 1991.  During this
period, the JNA forces added oil to the flames of rebellion, which
were blazing in expectation of the second phase.  General
Kadijevic defined the role of the JNA as the protection of Serbs in
Croatia from attacks by Croatian armed forces, and to allow them
to consolidate military organisation for the purpose of defence; at
the same time prepare the JNA for a war with Croatia once it
attacks the JNA.140 General Kadijevic was distorting the truth.  It
was not a case of Serbs being attacked but, rather, an armed
rebellion of their militant elements against the legitimate govern-
ment of the Republic of Croatia; the JNAs intervention tightened
the area onto which they desired to expand in the spring of 1991,
to the detriment of ethnically mixed regions. 
The second phase lasted from the beginning of March until
the beginning of July 1991.  During this period, the Serb terrorists
attempted to expand their illegal republic to areas in which they
did not have favourable status, although their numbers were  suf-
ficient enough to lay claim to yet another ancient plot of Serb
land.  Units of the JNA from this moment on became an overt
guardian and then participant in the same mission.  Next were
Pakrac, Plitvice, and Slavonia.  There was a limited number of vic-
tims in these initial, low-level confrontations.  The federal army
benefited from the experiences of the 52nd corpus in Kosovo.
Specifically, they demonstrated their force by the continual move-
ment of armoured and mechanised units and low flying fighter
planes, which was in clear contrast to the poorly armed Croatian
light infantry units.  The tactical leaders were the armoured and
mechanised brigades located in Croatian territory (4th armoured,
12th and 265th mechanised brigades) as well as units from other
areas: Banja Luka (329th armoured brigade), Panèevo (51st
mechanised brigade), Subotica (36th mechanised brigade), and
Sremska Mitrovica (453rd mechanised brigade). General
Kadijevic justified these tactics candidly: In order to execute the
given instructions, units of the JNA in and around Croatia must be
reinforced.  They must have two types of formations.  A large num-
ber of armoured and mechanised units from platoon to battalion
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strength should be positioned near the conflict areas so that they
can intervene quickly.  An adequate number of armoured and
mechanised units, brigade size or larger, should be positioned at
suitable checkpoints in and around Croatia so that they may be
engaged in enhanced operations.141 As was the case in the first
phase of the JNAs activities, General Kadijevic distorted the truth
in the second phase as well. Preparations for the use of armoured
and mechanised units began one year earlier, based on an order
of May 15, 1990, with the reclassification and reorganisation of
units in and around Croatia into A type, and establishment of the
10th corpus in Zagreb.142 It is crucial that this order was given one
day after the order to confiscate the weapons of the territorial
defence.  The ethnic cleansing, carried out by local Serbs, began
during this phase.  Units of the territorial defence, as they referred
to themselves, carried out their assignments with threats and phys-
ical intimidation, followed by a more effective formula: mas-
sacring all those who were deemed unsuitable. Blatant genocide
proved to be the most effective means for Serbs to reach their goal
of ethnically cleansing the areas of Croat and other non-Serb
populations.  The formula was suitable for the army as well, which
presented itself as a neutral factor whose basic assignment was to
create buffer zones.  The army was omnipresent when the success
of the terrorists (Dvor na Uni) needed bolstering, and when the
advances of regular Croat forces, should they prove detrimental
for the rebel Serbs (Pakrac, Plitvice) had to be stopped.
The beginning of July marked the start of the JNAs third phase
of aggression against Croatia:  segmented and ever- increasing
engagement in support of the rebel and volunteer Serb units, and
participation in their activities to such an extent that in September,
the JNA had become the main strategist.  The èetniks and other
paramilitary units were discarded as it became clear that they
could not make progress against the Croatian forces.  This was
especially clear in eastern Slavonia, where the JNA seized the bor-
ders of the Republic of Croatia with armoured and mechanised
units.  This was a offensive intended to intimidate Croatia as well
173
141. V. KADIJEVIC, My view of the break-up, p.127.
142. Of the four corpuses whose command was located in Croatia (9th,10th,13th and
32nd) only two (13th and 32nd) had the bulk of its troops located in areas with a
Croat majority.  Even though the 10th corpus was situated in Zagreb, the majority
of its units were located in regions with a large Serb population.  The 9th Knin cor-
pus was given the optimal transfer with the exception of units in Sinj, the remainder
was located in Serb dominated areas.  It is therefore no wonder that this corpus was
considered most successful during the war against Croatia 1991/92.  If one links
the zones of responsibility of the 9th corpus, 10th corpus and the 17th corpus of
the 1st military district it becomes clear that they approximate the boundary
Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag, which is the renowned western border of the propo-
nents of a great Serbia.143 Domino strategy, The Peoples Army, 2.X.1991.
as an important operative procedure that resulted in control by the
JNA of bridges on the Danube, which was a great advantage in
the further waging of war.  From these administrative borders the
JNA moved forward step-by-step, assisting the local Serb units
and various Serb partisan expansionist units.  In this manner,
Baranja and several Croatian villages in eastern Slavonia west of
the Danube (Dalj, Aljmaš and Erdut) were seized.  In other parts
of Croatia the peacekeeping role of the JNA was becoming intol-
erable, forcing the Croatian leadership to blockade JNA units
wherever possible.  In cities with a Croat majority, roads were
blocked, which was significant for the armoured and mechanised
units.  The arrival of new recruits from Croatia and Slovenia had
come to a complete halt, and there was also a significant reduc-
tion from other parts of Yugoslavia.  The unsuccessful mobilisation
of reserves at that time was another factor working to the JNAs
disadvantage. 
From the end of September and beginning of October, an
offensive began whose objective was to withdraw units from the
hinterlands and areas that were not envisioned for a greater
Serbia, and to penetrate the artificial borders.  The poor showing
of reserves condemned the plan to failure and forced the imple-
mentation of a new plan.  The explanation given to the public by
the defence minister of Serbia, Lieutenant General Tomislav
Simovic,  conflicted with the activities underway: combat activi-
ties…allowing for the evacuation of personnel, material, and
technical equipment from the surrounded garrisons in Croatia,
and foremost, preventing the genocide of Serb inhabitants living
in that republic by paramilitary units.143 The smokescreen, pre-
venting an ethnic conflict, was exposed, and the JNAs position
became clear.  The pretext of fighting to free barricaded garrisons
in Dubrovnik and Vukovar was nonsense, since, as Lord
Carrington stated, there were in these cities no barricaded gar-
risons or Serb inhabitants who must be protected.144 From an
operative standpoint, the offensives on these cities were incom-
prehensible.  Such an offensive is a very complex and sensitive
operation, and battles for cities are generally avoided;  cities are
bypassed and blocked by smaller units.  This is particularly true if
the attackers main strength lies in armoured and mechanised
units, whose  manoeuvrability is drastically reduced in city battles.
The armoured and mechanised divisions of the 12th corpus and
1st proletarian mechanised division corps lacked sufficient infantry
to escort their tanks.  Logically, Vukovar should have been
bypassed and blocked by small forces.  However, this was not the
case. Dubrovnik is even stranger.  It would have been logical for
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the forces of the 2nd Podgorica corpus and the 37th Užice corpus
to be dispatched through western Herzegovina towards Split.  This
was again not the case; the city was attacked.  As with Vukovar,
there is no military explanation. The reasoning behind the attacks
on these cities must apparently be sought elsewhere; perhaps in
the mentality that had for centuries advocated the right to neigh-
bouring lands.  In 1991, the balance of power was so favourable
for the Serbs that it would be senseless to draw a comparison.
Several thousand tanks confronted a few combat vehicles of the
Croatian police and hand-fashioned armoured vehicles.  This bal-
ance of power promised the fulfilment of the centuries- long
dream of a great Serbia.  In September 1991, when all this steel
machinery fired up, its navigators did not intend to leave
uncleansed territory behind.  The objective was to ethnically
cleanse everything and everyone that was non-Serb, and to erad-
icate any memory of these people.  This was the logic behind  the
attacks on cities and use of genocide to reach the main goal. This
was also the JNAs reason for waging war on Dubrovnik and
Vukovar.145
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145. At the beginning of the eighties the Serbs followed the same path as most institu-
tions and government bodies in Yugoslavia where they were the majority.  From a
super-national Yugoslav institution it transformed itself into the strong hand of
aggressive and chauvinistic Serb expansionism ten years later.  In the war that
Serbia waged against Croatia in 1991-92, the JNA nearsightedly and unsuccess-
fully attempted to engage all of Serbia and Montenegro.  Confirming their near-
sightedness was the statement made by General Jevrem Cokic regarding the use of
Montenegrin police for securing the Dubrovnik background, and the complaint by
commander of the 1st proletarian mechanized division corps General Dragoljub
Aranðelovic to reporters of The Peoples Army at the beginning of October 1991
when he stated that the statement made by an official of the Serbian government
regarding the substitution of recruits for obligatory military service after 45 days
proved to be quite problematic.  I find that statement to be nearsighted because it
directly affects the combat readiness of the units in a negative manner.  It concerns
troops which have overcome initial weaknesses that are normal considering the
radical change they experienced in their way of life and were placed directly into a
combat situation where their life is in danger, and now have some combat experi-
ence; we now must send them home and take in inexperienced troops which have
to experience what I have just mentioned from the beginning.  If it were not for this
decision the units would, considering the firepower and already mentioned experi-
ence, achieve greater results. The truth has overcome all barriers, The Peoples
Army, 9.I.92, p.14; As once before under the war flag, The Peoples Army, 2.X.91.,
p.4.
CONCLUSION
After the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980, the Socialist Federative
Republic of Yugoslavia entered the crisis-ridden eighties.  They
were marked by the Kosovo crises in 1981 and 1989, the long
standing economic crises, and the rise of great Serbian national-
ism directed against the federal state as conceived and confirmed
in the 1974 Constitution – a  phenomenon which triggered a
reaction from the non-Serb peoples.  The active participation of
the JNA made it clear that the Serb expansionism had also
engulfed this institution, which had a Serb majority and had for
years promoted itself as the last defender of Titos legacy.  At the
end of the eighties, the reorganisation of the armed forces of SFRY
was complete according to the Unity plan, which called for
extreme decentralisation. The organisational changes weakened
the  territorial defence, which contained elements of a republic
army, and strengthened the other component, the Yugoslav peo-
ples army. The military elite thus openly sided with Serbia and
Montenegro, which unlike the other republics promoted the cen-
tralisation of Yugoslavia.  The only foundation for such reorgani-
sation would have been a serious threat from outside, which was
an absurd assumption at the end of the Cold War.
After the triumph of democracy in Croatia, the JNA disarmed
the Croatian territorial defence prior to the change in leadership.
Simultaneously, it reorganised its forces in the greater Zagreb area
and began forming the 10th corpus, whose assignment was to
pacify the city using methods from the Kosovo battles in the eight-
ies.  Armoured and mechanised units positioned in and around
Croatia reinforced the peacetime structure of the army, which was
particularly important in regions where Croats were in the major-
ity. Dependence on troops was thus reduced, since these types of
units, with their firepower and mobility, were envisioned as the
leading force during the conflict in Croatia.
After the rebellion of the Serb minority in Croatia in August
1990, the JNA immediately took their side.  Until July 1991 it
operated through the buffer zone institution, allegedly separating
the conflicting parties; in reality its assignment was to prevent the
legally elected Croatian institutions from upholding constitutional-
ly defined order throughout the country.  From July 1991 the fed-
eral army supported the rebels by use of force against the
Croatian armed units.  At the end of September, a massive strate-
gic offensive was launched against Croatia in order to divide the
country, force surrender, and seize areas which were part of the
Serbian expansionist program. After unsuccessful operations, the
JNA satisfied itself with areas predominantly inhabited by Serbs,
and at the beginning of 1992 it proceeded to organise the rebel
Serb army prior to withdrawal from the area.   176
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